We examine the effect information asymmetries among syndicate members on loan spreads. In particular we measure the past relationship of each participant and arranger with the borrower separately by using the previous number of borrowing/lending interactions and the duration of these interactions. Using a sample of 5,842 syndicated loan transactions, we find that when participant banks have an information inferiority in the syndicate they require higher spreads to compensate for this asymmetry. This is amplified when the borrowers are more opaque. On the contrary, the availability of borrower credit ratings significantly reduces information asymmetries and nullifies the impact of information set differences among arrangers and participants on loan spreads. We also provide evidence that the presence of reputable arrangers leads to lower spreads only for those borrowers with potentially fewer asymmetric information problems. For opaque borrowers, mandating a reputable arranger facilitates access to funds available in the syndicated loan market but does not lower loan spreads.
INTRODUCTION
Information asymmetries in credit markets constitute the backbone of the financial intermediation theory. In fact information asymmetries have been one of the causes of the current financial crisis, as some investors took on risks they did not sufficiently understand. Innovative derivative instruments and securitization enabled the originators of loans to distribute the risk to investors with little knowledge about the credit quality of the borrowers. The market for syndicated loans is one of the major markets allowing such risk sharing and distribution. In the past decade, syndicated lending, where two or more banks agree jointly to make a loan to a single borrower, has evolved into a widespread banking practice. The international syndicated loan market was worth approximately 3.4 trillion USD in new facilities in 2007 prior to the crisis and represented one third of all funds raised internationally (including bond and equity issuance).
In a typical syndicated lending procedure, "arranger" banks are situated at the core of the loan syndication. They help put together the deal at a given set of terms and sell the loan to "participant" banks (i.e. second-tier banks and other investors), assigning some of the loan to themselves. Because they do not have the critical size, experience or desire to arrange loans themselves, "participant" banks do not normally negotiate directly with the borrowing firm, but rather have an "arm's-length" relationship and act through the arranger (Simons, 1993 and Sufi, 2007) . Participant banks rely heavily on arranger banks both before and after loan issuance. At the pricing stage of the loan prior to issuance, participant banks depend on the arranger bank for evaluating the credit quality of the borrower. Subsequent to the issuance, monitoring of and the relations with the debtor are often delegated to the arranger banks which are expected to mitigate borrower moral hazard. This delegation of responsibility and reliance on the arranger leads to information asymmetries among syndicate members. This is due to the fact that the arranger bears all the costs attached to the monitoring activity but shares only part of the benefits from engaging in a relationship, and would rationally refrain from putting in the optimum effort. Bharath et al. (2008) argue that participant banks are likely to anticipate arranger moral hazard in loan syndicates.
A body of literature investigates the implications of information asymmetries among lenders on the structure of loan syndicates. The possibility of moral hazard and opportunistic behaviour are examined at large (Simons, 1993 , Jones et al. 2000 , Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002 and Sufi, 2007 . All these recent papers conclude that arranger exploitative behaviour is inexistent. In particular, arrangers are found to be more committed to keeping higher proportions 1 of low quality loans granted to borrowers requiring high levels of monitoring.
In contrast, research exploring the effect of such information asymmetries among lenders on loan pricing is limited. Rare examples are Ivashina (2009) and Casolara et al. (2008) . Both find that loans where arrangers retain a higher proportion are judged as less risky by participants banks, and therefore carry lower interest rates. Bharath et al. (2008) also examine the impact of repetitive lending on loan spreads when asymmetries among syndicate members (entailing arranger moral hazard) are present and conclude that past relationships can mitigate syndicate moral hazard issues by serving as a commitment to monitor. The shortfall of these studies is the reliance of indirect proxies that such as syndicate size and arranger behaviour to quantify the information asymmetries among syndicate members. Their approach fails to capture the participant banks' information sets about the borrower. Participant banks' past lending experience with the same borrower might reduce information asymmetries among participants and arrangers in the lending syndicate. In case of repetitive lending participants will not solely rely on information passed by the arranger but will consider their own information sets too.
In this paper we examine the effect of information asymmetries among lenders on the loan price. In any loan transactions the riskiness of the borrower is reflected in the price and credible borrowers pay less. In a bilateral loan the price is determined by a single lender depending on its' information set about the borrower. In lending syndicates the price of the loan is determined by negotiations between the arranger and the participant banks. Based on the papers cited above, it is generally realistic to expect that in lending syndicates information asymmetries between the arranger and the participant banks would be reflected on the loan price. More specifically, we expect two sets of effects. Firstly, participant banks might require an extra risk premium at the initial pricing stage of the loan if they have less information than the arranger on the credit quality of the prospective borrower. Secondly, participant banks may demand higher prices to hedge against any possibility of ex post arranger moral hazard in monitoring activities. In addition, we also look at whether reputation of the arranger facilitate the reduction of information asymmetries.
Using a sample of 5,842 syndicated loan transactions, we find that when participant banks have an information inferiority in the syndicate they require a higher spreads for the increasing risk arising from information asymmetries. This is amplified when the borrowers are more opaque.
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The availability of a borrower credit rating significantly reduces information asymmetries and nullifies the impact of information set differences among arrangers and participants on loan spreads. We also provide evidence that the presence of reputable arrangers leads to lower spreads only for those borrowers with potentially fewer asymmetric information problems. For opaque borrowers, mandating a reputable arranger facilitates accession to finance in the syndicated loan market but does not lower the cost of borrowing.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The following section draws a brief literature review on arranger moral hazard in syndicated lending and pricing.
Subsequently, Section 3 details the data, methodology and variables. In Section 4 we present the results and Section 5 concludes.
ARRANGER MORAL HAZARD, REPUTATION AND SYNDICATED LOAN PRICING
The literature on financial intermediation tends to explain the nature and purpose of banking in terms of the bank's capacity to mitigate asymmetric information through the banker-customer relationship -referred to as "relationship banking". In this respect, banks are quite distinct compared to other "arm's lengths" lenders and providers of direct finance. According to Petersen and Rajan (1994) Several studies (Simons, 1993 , Jones et al. 2000 , Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002 and Sufi, 2007 have examined the arranger's role and potential arranger moral hazard and opportunistic behaviour by arrangers. Simons (1993) and Jones et al. (2000) use credit ratings (at the time of loan signing) as a measure of borrower creditworthiness and examine whether this influences the size of the arranger's retained share of the loan. Both papers conclude that arrangers typically retain larger shares of the loans if the borrower credit ratings are lower. Panyagometh and Roberts (2002) focus on changes observed in the borrower's credit ratings subsequent to the loan signing.
They find that arrangers do not take advantage of information asymmetries and keep larger shares of loans when a company's credit rating was subsequently downgraded.
In a recent study, Sufi (2007) also confirms that when borrowers require high levels of monitoring, lending syndicates tend to be more concentrated and the lead bank retains a higher share of the loan. In summary there is a consensus in the literature that arranger banks you mean do not exploit their information advantages.
One factor limiting arranger moral hazard is reputation. From the borrowers' perspective the reputation of the arranger bank is acknowledged to be a significant factor for the success of a syndication. Investment and commercial banks engaging in an arranger role have to build trust with potential participant members of the syndicate. Failing to do so might lead to loss of substantial fee income from global subsequent debt underwriting activities 3 . Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) , Lee and Mullineaux (2001) and Panyagometh and Roberts (2002) have also examined the influence of the arranger's reputation on the success of a loan syndication. They find that a syndication is more likely to be successful with a larger loan amount and more participants when the arranger has a good reputation as an arranger in the market.
Moreover, these studies also suggest that borrowers within the same risk category A shortfall of the abovementioned studies' analysis is the reliance on indirect proxies of arrangers' and participants' information sets such as syndicate size and arranger behaviour to measure the information asymmetries among participants. Their approach fails to directly capture the participant banks' information set about the borrower. In fact none of the studies measure participants' knowledge about the borrower explicitly but rely on indicators related to shares retained by arrangers, syndicate structure or borrower credit quality. However, discussions in these papers directly relate to participants past lending experiences with the borrower.
Participants' past lending experience with the same borrower will reduce the information asymmetries among syndicate members. In case of repetitive lending, participants will not solely rely on information passed by the arranger but will also consider their own information sets. In this paper we directly measure the arrangers' and participants' information sets about the borrower. Specifically, we measure the past relationship of each participant and arranger separately by using the previous number of borrowing/lending interactions on the syndicated loan market as well as the duration of these interactions with the borrower. Subsequently we construct a proxy to compare the information set of the syndicate participants with that of the arranger for each transaction. In the next section we detail the variables, data and methodology.
DATA and METHODOLOGY
We obtained our data from Loanware, a commercial database which contains detailed information on syndicated loan contracts. Information is provided on the terms (such as maturity, loan size, collateral, covenants) and identification of the borrower, lead arrangers, and participant lenders. Although the database reports over 112,000 case, the arranger has more incentives to perform monitoring duties. On the other hand, the arranger sets the spread depending on its own retained share of the loan, the latter has implications for its credit-risk exposure and diversification inside its loan portfolio. Like Ivashina (2009) , to overcome this simultaneity effects we estimate a two-stage least squares method. At the first stage we estimate arrangers' share retention by using control variables reflecting the credit risk of the borrower and the specific loan. At the second stage we estimate the loan spread by using computed arranger share estimates from the first stage. The following models are estimated: Spread is measured as basis points over LIBOR. We use the all-in drawn spread which reflects the total cost of the loan including spread and fees paid. We explain the main explanatory variables in detail below. We measure repetitive lending and length of the relationship separately for arranger and participant banks to gauge the impact of these on pricing separately. In general, arrangers are assumed to be the relationship banker of the borrower and participant banks mostly rely on the arranger bank for proprietary customer information. This might be the case when the participant joins a syndicate for a specific borrower for the first time. However, the participant bank will become more familiar with same the borrower in case of repetitive lending and over time, information asymmetries will diminish. Hence in subsequent syndications for the same borrower, the participants will not solely rely on arrangers. In summary, both the participants and arrangers will develop their own relationship and will have their own information sets about the borrower. We calculate these variables as follows 9 :
Past relationship and repetitive lending measures
1. Arrangers' repetitive lending ( weighted by their amount of participation to the current loan. As participants contribute to the loan disproportionately, by using a weighted average we control for the importance that will be given to the loan by a specific participant's previous relationship with the borrower 12 .
Participants' length of relationship (PartLenght):
Average of all participants' length of relationship from the time when they engage in first syndicated loan transaction with the borrower. Once again we use values weighted by participant contributions 13 .
9 Additionally we employ an alternative simpler relationship variable (Rel_dummy) that represents any interaction between the lending syndicate and the borrower. Rel_dummy is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if either arrangers or participants have a past relationship with the borrower (acting as arrangers or participants, respectively) and 0 otherwise. Ivashina (2009) also controls for relationship lending, but only for the arrangers' relationship, with a dummy variable. 10 For instance, if a loan syndicate is managed by two arrangers with 2 and 4 previous transaction record with the borrower then ArrRepeat will be 3 for the current loan syndicate's arrangers. 11 For instance, in a loan syndicate with two arrangers, if an arranger has known the borrower for 5 years and the other for 6 then ArrLenght will be 5.5. 12 For instance, assume that a loan syndicate has two participant banks (excluding the arrangers) with 2 and 4 previous transaction record with the borrower. They contribute to the loan at 60% and 40% respectively (as a percentage of participants shares only, excluding the arrangers share). In this case ParRepeat would be calculated as (0.60*2) + (0.40*4) equalling 2.8. 13 For instance, assume that a loan syndicate has two participant banks (excluding the arrangers) which have known the borrower for 1 and 5 years respectively. If the participants contribute to the loan at
It is important to note that the past relationship lending variables presented above should be considered with precaution in terms of "traditional" relationship lending.
The term "relationship banking" is not particularly sharply defined in the literature, apart from references to "close bank relationships," no definition is provided (Boot, 2000) . Typical feature of a relationship bank is the investment in obtaining customerspecific beyond readily available public information. In syndicated lending participant banks' ability to act as a "close relationship bank" is limited. Hence the variables defined here aims to capture the past relationships and repetitive lending of participant banks with the borrower in the syndicated loan market only.
Measures for information asymmetry among arrangers and participants
To capture the effect of information asymmetries among arranger and participant banks we introduce the following two variables. A dummy variable that identifies the first time borrowers in the syndicated loan market is also employed. The lack of familiarity of market participants with a new 60% and 40% respectively (as a percentage of participants shares only, excluding the arrangers share), then PartLenght would be calculated as (0.60*1) + (0.40*5) equalling 2.6.
Difference in the number of previous lending relationships (DiffRepeat):
borrower, requiring intensive monitoring, signals potentially higher information asymmetries and may have an impact on financing rates 14 .
Arranger reputation and control variables
We include a dummy variable to test the impact of arranger's reputation on the loan price. Sufi (2007) (2000), Lee and Mullineux (2001) and Panyagometh and Roberts (2002) have all pointed out that a syndication process is more successful and the loan is more marketable when the arranger is a reputable firm in the market. 16 We use credit ratings reported by Moody's and S&P.
Descriptive Statistics
lenders and the borrower widens. Average loan size of a typical syndicated loan is 396 USD million with a maturity of 3.6 years and carries 116 basis points spread over LIBOR.
In Table 2 A visual inspection on the data reveals where this finding stems from. Arrangers tend to work with the same participant banks when they are extending new loans, or rolling over deals, to existing borrowers. In other words the loan syndication structure in terms of participants change only slightly when the same borrower taps the market.
However this is not valid for all the transactions in our sample. As minimum and maximum figures suggest, in some transactions there are large information asymmetries among the syndicate participants.
To observe the level of information asymmetries further, in Table 2 Panel B we provide a frequency distribution of the ArrRepeat differences between the arrangers and participants for each loan transaction. We observe that in 71 per cent (54.2 plus 16.8 per cent) of the loan deals ArrRepeat differences are not more than 0.5 times. In other words, none of the parties (either arrangers or participants) have a significantly higher previous lending relationship with the borrower. However, in the rest 29 per cent of the deals one of the parties has information advantage over the other. This corresponds to 1,693 syndicated loan deals in our sample. Specifically, in 677 (or 12 per cent) of these deals one of the parties have no previous relationship with the borrower while the other party have dealt with the borrower at least once. Therefore, although in a majority of transactions we observe similar syndicate members displaying minimal information asymmetries amongst them, in around one thirds of all deals there may be significant asymmetries affecting the pricing of the loan.
Finally, we examine the association between our relationship variables through a simple correlation analysis (presented in Table 2 Panel C). Coefficients show that our alternative relationship variables for arrangers and participants are highly correlated.
This has some implications to the analysis. Firstly, it does not make a difference if we measure relationship lending either by number of interactions or length of time.
Secondly, as arrangers and borrowers mainly work together in successive deals, values of their relationship variables (both repetition and length) are similar. Due to multicollinearity we can only employ one of these variables at a time in regression analysis which the findings are presented and discussed in the next section.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
RESULTS

Whole sample
In Table 3 we report the coefficient estimates from the second stage of 2SLS regressions 17, 18 . The estimates are presented in six columns employing the key independent variables alone (Columns I -IV) or simultaneously (Columns V and VI) 19 . The signs and significance of the variables are consistent in all models.
ArrRepeat, found to be negative and statistically significant, is the major indicator for measuring the level of previous relationships between lenders and borrowers 20 . As the interaction increases between the syndicate members and the borrower through the engagement of successive lending/repayment cycles, banks' extraction of proprietary information amplifies and the subsequent reduction in information asymmetries reduces the riskiness of the borrower. This decrease in riskiness is reflected to the 17 Results of the first stage regressions estimating arranger share are available upon request. 18 We briefly report on the control variables utilized. The coefficients are in line with the existing literature on the pricing of syndicated loans. In accordance with Carey and Nini (2007) , spreads are lower when the loans are arranged on the European market. Spreads increase with maturity and decrease with the size of the facility. Everything else equal, externally guaranteed loans carry lower spreads while the presence of collateral tends to be associated with higher interest rates. The latter result, which is commonly observed in the literature, is attributed to the fact that lenders demand (and obtain) collateral pledges only from those borrowers that pose the higher risk. We find that the proxies for overall market conditions do not have a significant effect in the pricing regression. It appears that the year dummy variables account for most of the systematic variation in the spreads. 19 Control variables are not reported. 20 As noted before, due to complications of multicollinearity, we only use one relationship variable which is the ArrRepeat. In untabulated regressions we observed similar results for other relationship variables (ArrLenght, PartRepeat and PartLenght) described above.
price of the loan as a discount. The alternative variable Rel_dummy also confirms our finding above. This finding coincides with Bharath et al. (2007) and Ivashina (2009) .
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Two variables employed to signal the possible information asymmetries among arrangers and participant banks are DiffRepeat and PartPerArr. We report a significant and a positive coefficient for DiffRepeat. Arrangers' information advantage, which is gained through previous lending relationships with the prospective borrower, over the participants of the syndicate leads to higher spreads.
In other words if participant banks have an information inferiority in the syndicate, a higher spread is charged due to information asymmetries between them and the borrower. This finding may have several interpretations. Firstly, it is noticeable that participants have a tendency to demand compensation through higher returns for the increasing credit risk that arise from information asymmetries when the arranger have information superiority. Secondly, participants seem to be aware of the moral hazard (in the form of insufficient monitoring by the arrangers) and therefore require a higher return for the risk involved. Moreover, the result demonstrates the bargaining power of participant banks on the pricing of the syndicated loan. Participants banks have the ability to influence the pricing depending on their own information set about the borrower.
We also find PartPerArr to be positive and statistically significant. The loan spread increases when the number of participants per arranger increases. The flow of information between the arrangers and participants during the formation stage of the syndicate is potentially limited since the arranger(s) needs(s) to market the loan to a larger group of participants. Potential information asymmetries observed in such syndicates are higher and participants attempt to compensate for such asymmetries by demanding higher spreads for the funds they are extending.
Opaque borrowers
We further examine the impact of asymmetric information on the cost of borrowing for opaque borrowers. First, we focus on borrowers entering the market for the first time and subsequently compare firms with and without credit rating. A higher degree of information asymmetry is expected for new firms in the debt market and for firms which do not have a credit rating. For such borrowers the information asymmetries between arranger and syndicate members are also argued to be high. Therefore, arranger moral hazard is more likely to occur. The first indicator employed to signify the information asymmetry is the dummy variable, firstime. The coefficient and sign of this variable indicates that a new borrower tapping the market is paying higher spreads (see Table 3 , Model VI).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Subsequently we divide our sample into two groups of firms with and without credit rating (Table 4 ). The results reveal that the impact of ArrRepeat and DiffRepeat on loan spreads is significantly higher for borrowers without a credit rating: both variables display significantly higher coefficients when compared to the whole sample (in Model VI, Table 3 ). The interpretation of the results are twofold. Firstly, borrowers which potentially have higher information asymmetries benefit more from previous relationship lending in terms of borrowing costs. Secondly, the magnitude of information set differences between the arranger and the participants have a stronger effect on the loan spreads when the borrower does not have a credit rating.
In such cases if the arrangers have an information superiority about the borrower, then participant banks in the syndicate anticipate a higher arranger moral hazard, hence, demand higher return for the loan extended. For borrowers with a credit rating both
ArrRepeat and DiffRepeat are insignificant. The availability of credit ratings significantly reduces information asymmetries and the impact of information set differences among arrangers and participants on loan spreads. The results further signify that firms with fewer information asymmetries do not benefit from relationship banking in terms of cost of borrowing. In Table 4 we also present results for those observations where there are minimal information asymmetries among lenders. In these cases ArrRepeat loses its significance. This may be due to the fact that there are a lot of first time borrowers in the restricted sample, with no previous relationship banking with the lending syndicate.
Arranger reputation and loan retention
Another significant finding of our paper is the relation between arranger reputation and loan spreads. Sufi (2007) argues that reputation can mitigate, but not completely eliminate, problems of asymmetry. Arrangers refrain from moral hazard to protect their reputation in the credit markets to secure future business from both lenders and borrowers. Literature (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000 , Lee and Mullineaux, 2001 and Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002 ) also reports that arranger reputation leads to lower spreads for the borrower. Here we provide evidence which partially supports this argument. We find ArrReputation to be statistically significant only for borrowers with a credit rating. For these less opaque borrowers, an experienced and well known arranger has an impact on the pricing and lowers the spread. Perhaps participants have more confidence on reputable arrangers' monitoring skills and do not anticipate arranger moral hazard. Hence they agree to lower returns. Reputation effect on pricing is not significant for opaque borrowers. Mandating a reputable arranger certainly facilitates opaque firms' access to funds in the syndicated loan markets.
However reputable arrangers does not benefit opaque firms in terms of lowering borrowing costs.
Theory predicts that asymmetric information will cause participants to demand a higher interest rate and that a large loan ownership by the lead bank should reduce this effect (Ivashina, 2009 ). Like Bharath et al. (2008) and Ivashina (2009) we find a negative relationship between the share of the loan retained by the arranger and the spread in the main models presented in Table 3 . More ownership by the arrangers reduces participant banks' anticipation of arranger moral hazard, as the arranger is expected to put the optimum effort to monitor the borrower. However, this does not seem to be the case for opaque borrowers (Table 4) . For borrowers without a credit rating we report a positive relationship between the share held by the arranger and the spread. This finding reflects the fact that we cannot control for the borrowers' default risk in these models through credit ratings. In fact the results capture the default risk effects of the borrowers' on spreads. Arrangers keep a higher share of risky loans and this is more likely for opaque borrowers (Panyagometh and Roberts, 2002 and Sufi, 2007) . In our sample the average share retained by the arranger is 37% for borrowers with a credit rating and 43% for borrower without a credit rating.
The impact is more prevalent when there is no information asymmetries between the arranger and participants. In this restricted sample most of the firms are first time borrowers, which are deemed to be more opaque, and therefore carry a higher default risk.
CONCLUSION
Recently, syndicated lending has evolved into a widespread banking practice and has been an active area of research. Academic studies have examined the arrangers' role and potential arranger moral hazard and opportunistic behaviour by arrangers in loan syndications. Although these studies do explain the influence of asymmetric information on the structure and formation of the lending syndicates they often do not use direct proxies of the lenders' knowledge about the borrower. Rather, they rely on indirect proxies for arrangers' and participants' information sets that are contingent on syndicate size and arranger behaviour to measure the information asymmetries among participants. In this paper we use alternative proxies for gauging the information asymmetries among the members of lending syndicate. In particular we measure the relationship of each participant and arranger separately by using previous number of borrowing/lending interactions and duration of these interactions with the prospective borrower.
We find that when participant banks have an information inferiority in the syndicate, a higher interest is charged for the loan. This is amplified when the borrowers are more opaque. Our results imply that participants with information inferiority consider the possible arranger moral hazard on monitoring and therefore require a higher return for the risk involved. Participants have a tendency to demand compensation through higher returns for the increasing credit risk that arise from information asymmetries.
The results demonstrate the bargaining power of participant banks on the pricing of the syndicated loan. The availability of borrower credit ratings significantly reduces information asymmetries and nullifies the impact of information set differences among arrangers and participants on loan spreads. Rated borrowers are also less likely to benefit from relationship banking in terms of cost of borrowing. One other significant finding is the relation between arranger reputation and loan spreads. We provide evidence that the presence of reputable arrangers leads to lower spreads but only for those borrowers with potentially fewer asymmetric information problems. ArrRepeat is an average of all arrangers' previous lending arrangements with the borrower. For instance, if a loan syndicate is managed by two arrangers with 2 and 4 previous transaction record with the borrower then ArrRepeat will be 3 for the current loan syndicate's arrangers. ArrLenght is measured by years, this proxy is the average of all arrangers' length of relationship from the time when they engage in first syndicated loan transaction with the borrower. For instance, in a loan syndicate with two arrangers, if an arranger has known the borrower for 5 years and the other for 6 then ArrLenght will be 5.5. PartRepeat is an average of all syndicate participants' previous lending arrangements with the borrower, weighted by their amount of participation to the current loan.
PartLenght is an average of all participants' length of relationship from the time when they engage in first syndicated loan transaction with the borrower (weighted by participant contributions). ArrRepeat is an average of all arrangers' previous lending arrangements with the borrower. For instance, if a loan syndicate is managed by two arrangers with 2 and 4 previous transaction record with the borrower then ArrRepeat will be 3 for the current loan syndicate's arrangers. DiffRepeat is equal to ArrRepeat divided by PartRepeat (PartRepeat is an average of all syndicate participants' previous lending arrangements with the borrower, weighted by their amount of participation to the current loan). PartPerArr equals to the number of participants divided by the number of arrangers organising the syndicate. Firstime is a dummy variable that identifies the first time borrowers in the syndicated loan market is also employed. ArrReputation, takes the value of 1 if the arranger bank is declared as top 10 arrangers (in terms of number of deals) by Thomson Financial League tables between 1993 and 2006 and 0 otherwise. Arrshare is the arrangers' loan retention. It is estimated at the first stage regression by using control variables reflecting the credit risk of the borrower and the specific loan. 
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